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Abstract  
 The broad objective of this research was to determine whether gender 
diversity of boards and board composition, affects performance. Secondary 
data was collected for a ten-year period from 2006 to 2015 from 98 sampled 
financial institutions. Multiple regression analysis and generalized estimating 
equations were used in analysis of the collected data. Parametric and non-
parametric methodologies were used. The study was anchored on the agency 
theory, stakeholder theory, the human capital theory and resource 
dependence theory. The results show that, gender diversity of boards 
and board composition had no independent significant influence on 
performance of financial institutions. Through the study formulation of 
managerial policy and practice that promote better governance practices and 
appropriate firm characteristics that improve performance of financial 
institutions will be enhanced. 
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Introduction 
 Boards of directors provide an internal governance mechanism 
(versus the external governance from shareholders and other external 
stakeholders) that is particularly important in order to oversee and advise the 
organization’s managers (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). For board members to 
efficiently oversee and advise, they need to have a structure that supports 
such activities (Jackling & Johl, 2009; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Workforce 
gender diversity has attracted the attention of press and scholars over time. In 
particular, focus has been laid on addressing “glass ceiling effect” (Farrell & 
Hersch, 2001, p.30). Many scholars have researched on the trend and effect 
of workforce diversity on firm performance and especially among the high 
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level managers. (Terjesen, & Singh, 2008; Dejardin, 2009). When top 
management is comprised of female employees, it is anticipated that it will 
positively affect firm performance. On the contrary, it has been argued that 
gender diversity can negatively affect firm performance by increasing 
absenteeism and turnover. It may also end up creating conflict which breaks 
the team spirit. (Herring, 2009).  
 Empirical evidence has yielded mixed and contradictory results on 
the optimal board structure (Dalton et al., 1998). However, most are in 
agreement about the important variables representing board structure and 
that may have an impact on the monitoring and thus performance. The 
debate about influence of gender diversity on firm performance however, 
continues since results of previous studies have been conflicting (Dalton et 
al., 1998). This suggests that there are other intervening factors like board 
Composition and firm characteristics which come into play. In transition 
economies, ownership concentration is high and relates to corporate 
governance, financing and investment in the organization. Most firms are 
saturated with institutional investors with a small stake left for retail 
investors. Ownership for most firms is distributed among institutional 
investors and retail investors; with ownership concentrated mainly to 
institutional investors (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
 Conceptualization in this study is underpinned by the agency theory 
whose key paradigm is the agency conflict. This conflict occurs when the 
principal assigns another the agent services that should be done in a 
particular manner (Ross 1973). Other theories include the resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The theory attributes 
production of a firm’s assets to the board members. These assets shape the 
behavior of the organization and its environment. Stakeholder theory forms a 
theoretical foundation for board diversity. It is worth noting that corporate 
governance theories focus on the owner’s interests and ignore other 
stakeholders. Stakeholder theory therefore brings attention to the managers’ 
duty of protecting long-term interests of all stakeholders and this influences 
the board’s role. (Freeman & Evan, 1988). Johnson and Greening (1999) 
argued that when stakeholder groups are represented by board members, they 
give insight into the expectations of the various stakeholders. Human capital 
theory is the fourth and is important in explaining the association among 
board diversity and firm performance.  
 According to Becker (1964), human capital theory addresses the role 
of an individual’s education, experience, and skills that will be of use to the 
firm (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh, 2009 in Carter 2010).  
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Research Objectives 
 The general objective of this research was to determine whether a 
relationship exists among gender diversity of boards, board composition and 
performance of financial institutions in Kenya.  
 
Empirical Review 
Gender Diversity of Boards  
 Corporate diversity has been defined variously. One approach looks 
at as differences in the age, ethnicity, race, gender, and social/cultural 
identities among employees in the institution (Marimuthu, 2008). Van der 
Walt and Ingley (2003) defined board diversity as the blend of attributes, 
traits and skills possessed by the board members. This also applies to top 
management in a firm. Gender diversity can also be defined as consideration 
of women and men as equal resources. Gender diversity in the working 
environment refers to the mix of men and women in the workplace (Herring 
2009). Boardroom gender diversity is the presence of women in the board 
(Dutta & Bose 2006). This study adopts the definition by Dutta and Bose 
(2006).  
 Empirical evidence on the association among gender diversity and 
organizational effectiveness cannot be easily interpreted. At first glance there 
exists a positive correlation among diversity and institutional performance. 
However, with introduction of other board structure variables, this 
correlation fades away. The reverse causality on the other hand is detrimental 
to the relationship. Some studies have argued that firm’s strategies can affect 
the ability of female directors to affect institutional performance (Dezsò & 
Ross, 2012) and willingness to take the risk (Smith, Smith & Verner, 2006). 
Generally, business case evidence for female directors is found to cut both 
sides. 
 Some prior studies have shown that board diversity positively affects 
firm financial performance (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003) while some concluded otherwise (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Carter et al., 2010; De Andres et al., 2005; Rose, 2007). Despite mixed 
results regarding the impact of board diversity on performance, board 
composition diversity is favored for these key reasons (Kang, Cheng, & 
Gray, 2007). First is that diversity boosts discussion and sharing of ideas 
which enhances performance. Board diversity provides different ideas and 
views in facing problems and solving them. This way, better decisions are 
made and firm performance is enhanced. Secondly, the board’s role of 
protecting stakeholders’ interests can better be achieved when all the 
stakeholders are represented in the board. Board diversity can be seen as an 
ideal way of being ‘representative’. Kamaara, Gachunga and Waititu (2013) 
concluded that there is a strong association among board characteristics and 
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performance of state corporations in Kenya. Letting, Aosa and Machuki 
(2012), found that a significant positive association exists among; Return on 
Assets and age of the members of the board, women on the board, 
educational qualifications and members of the board professional 
specialization; dividends yield (DY) and age of board members and 
educational qualifications. Sanda, Mikailu and Garba, (2005) concluded that 
separating the CEO from the board chair favours the firm and that   Nigerian 
listed firms should maintain a board size of ten. 
 Ongore, K’Obonyo, Ogutu and Bosire (2015) established that gender 
diversity has a positive effect on firm performance. They also point out that 
number of female directors observed in their study was significantly lower 
than male directors. Considering board composition in the Kenyan context, 
the study shows that gender disparity can affect firm performance. Although 
it is easy to observe the increase in number of women directors, assessment 
of the influence and involvement of women directors is more difficult due to 
the inaccessibility of the boardroom processes. Moreover, researchers have 
mainly been interested in the bottom-line effects of women directors rather 
than on their role. Whereas some have found a positive association among 
gender diversity and firm performance (Letting, Aosa & Machuki, 2012; 
Carter et al., 2003; and Erhardt, Werbel, Shrader, 2003), some have 
concluded that the relationship is negligible (Dale-Olsen, Schone, & Verner, 
2010), and some have even concluded that the overall relationship is 
negative (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Letting, Aosa and Machuki (2012), 
provide evidence that scholars have focused on the influence of the board 
members’ gender and educational qualification on firm performance. 
Common attributes of board members are age, level of education, gender, 
and experience. Therefore, from these attributes, Board diversity can directly 
or indirectly impact firm performance. The board is responsible for policy 
development and strategic direction making, thus it is an important part of 
corporate governance mechanism. 
 
Board Composition 
 Board composition maybe defined as the extent to which there exists 
independence between members of a firm's board and it’s CEO. Several 
approaches have been used to capture this perspective. One considers the 
proportion of executive board members to total board members (Baysinger, 
Kosnik & Turk, 1991) while other approaches focus on the proportion of 
non-executive board members to total board members. Analysis of the 
determinants of corporate financial performance is essential for all the 
stakeholders. Generally, there is not much evidence that board composition 
has any cross-sectional association to firm performance. Empirical evidence 
concludes that board composition has no effect on firm performance, and 
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absence of an association among leadership structure and firm performance. 
Shareholder activism ensures there is accountability and transparency in the 
board dealings. 
 
Firm Performance  
 Firm performance is an imperative idea that describes the means and 
ways through which organizational resources are employed to achieve 
corporate strategy. It keeps the organization a float and brings about better 
vision for future opportunities (Hoskisson et al., 1994). Performance of the 
firm relates to its efficiency, effectiveness, financial viability and relevance. 
Effectiveness brings out the peculiar abilities which organizations must 
embrace in ensuring attainment of their missions.  Efficiency is described as 
the unit cost of output which is much less than the input leaving no 
alternative option through which the input can be reduced for the same 
amount of output (Machuki & Aosa, 2011). Financial viability on the other 
hand has been defined as a firm’s ability to harness its financial resources 
which are its inflow of financial resources that must be greater than the 
outflow. Relevance is the ability of a firm to develop in ways that 
consolidate their strengths. Ricardo et al. (2001) defines performance as the 
ability of a firm to maximize strengths to overcome its weaknesses to 
neutralize its threats and take advantages of opportunities. 
 Performance measurement is characterized by measurement 
difficulties. While the study has zeroed in on performance, some scholars 
have expressed concern that the field has yielded inconclusive results, often 
drawing ‘‘seemingly conflicting findings’’ regarding the determinants of 
performance. Awino (2011) concludes that no single variable can effectively 
influence a firm’s performance. Performance measures are many and varied 
with some schools of thought advocating for financial performance measures 
and others for the non-financial performance measures. Not a single measure 
of performance can completely explain all aspects of the term due to 
organizational objectives and contextual factors (Snow & Hambrick, 1980). 
This may be partly because definition of performance incorporates 
efficiency-related measures, relating to the input/output models and 
effectiveness related measures, dealing with issues such as growth, employee 
satisfaction, commitment, and turnover (Mayer & Schoorman, 1992; 
Machuki & Aosa, 2011). Sometimes, performance is conceptually confused 
with productivity. Productivity is defined as a ratio which depicts the volume 
of work completed within a defined period of time.  Performance is therefore 
broader, and productivity is one of its indicators (Ricardo, 2001). 
 Firm performance usually represents the quality of the firm’s on-
going relationship with the environment. It can be represented by growth, 
profitability, and other non-financial indicators. Firm performance depends 
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on the context and incorporates indicators in multiple analysis levels (Kaplan 
& Norton, 1992). While its description refers to a particular point in time, 
development, periodic change and varied time scales will need to be 
considered. Static efficiency may lead to instability in the long run and a 
temporary misfit could be required to attain long-term dynamic fit. Due to 
this, incompatible short-term and long-term alliances need to be sorted out in 
firm performance. It also needs to show how a firm is effectively exploiting 
available resources while generating new ones. 
 Firm performance may also be said to be a multi-dimensional 
construct (Chakravathy, 1986); which a single index may not necessarily be 
able to give a detailed understanding of relationship compared to the 
particular construct of interest. Different performance measures exist 
including both long-term and short-term market performance measures. 
Studies document several measures that have been used to varying extent 
including market value added (MVA), return on assets (ROA), economic 
value added (EVA), free cash flow enhancement, earnings per share (EPS) 
enhancement, asset enhancement, dividend enhancement, and revenue 
enhancement (Abdullah, 2004). For instance, Dehaene et al. (2001) adopted 
return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) as measures of firms’ 
performance and concluded that this was effective in providing adequate 
performance information while Chen et al. (2005) suggested that market 
related measures were better and thus used the market-to-book ratio in their 
study of firms. Hong Kong. Judge et al. (2003) used several indicators which 
included both quantitative and qualitative measures such as profitability, 
customer satisfaction, product/service quality, capacity optimisation and 
business process enhancement in assessment of institutional performance. 
Firm performance remains a challenging concept both in terms of how it 
should be defined and measured because of its multifaceted and 
multidimensional nature. Most studies of firm performance posit that 
performance is a dependent variable and seek to identify variables that 
explain variation in terms of performance.  
 Ocasio, 1994 and Hoskisson et al., 1994 find that accounting-based 
financial measures, market-based measures including combinations of both 
have been relied upon in most studies which focus on the association among 
corporate governance and profitability of an institution. Accounting based 
performance indicators of the firm rely on accounting ratios that do not 
incorporate the stock market variables while measures that are based on 
market variables include the Tobins Q and return on the market which 
incorporate the stock price. Financial accounting measures despite having 
been criticized many times have been relied on by many studies. The 
criticism emanates from the fact that such measures (1) can aid in creative 
accounting through, manipulating accounting information; (2) may likely 
European Scientific Journal December 2017 edition Vol.13, No.34 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
68 
devalue assets; (3) generate biases as a result of accounting policies and 
methods adopted by the firm; and (4) lack standardization in financial 
reporting as some jurisdictions have not adopted international financial 
reporting standards. Also, interpretation of financial accounting statements 
and ratios is subjective in case of cross cutting industry participation by the 
various firms (Nayyar, 1992) or where the firm’s ownership structures are 
varied.  
 In contrast, market-based measures have several benefits. Risk 
adjusted performance measurement is reflected in these indicators; they are 
not negatively impacted upon by cross cutting industry or multinational 
contexts (Nayyar, 1992). Deckop, 1987 concludes that the main reason for 
this is that market-based performance indicators are in control of external 
forces and not within the management’s control. Literature does not 
document any consensus concerning the efficacy of dependence on either 
accounting-based indicators or market-based indicators, many studies have 
resorted to using a mix of the financial performance measures. 
 
Methodology 
Research Design, Data and Sampling  
 Using data from a developing country, Kenya, a descriptive 
correlational research design was adopted. The data required was collected 
for a ten-year period from 2006 to 2015 for the institutions that were 
sampled from the financial sector in Kenya, through data collection sheets 
from annual reports and company websites. The population of the research 
was 3989 financial institutions in Kenya comprising of five regulators, 43 
commercial banks, 10 Investment banks, two development banks and one 
mortgage finance company, 41 insurance companies, nine deposit taking 
micro-finance institutions, and 3,887 Sacco’s 
(http://www.centralbank.go.ke). The study followed the simple stratified 
random sampling in obtaining viable set of data sets and sampled 98 firms 
from all the categories.  
 
Data Analysis  
 Multiple regression analysis was used in analysis of the collected 
data. Parametric and non-parametric methodologies were used. Non-
parametric (or non-distribution) inferential statistical methods are 
mathematical procedures to test statistical hypothesis which, unlike 
parametric statistics, do not make any assumptions about the probability 
distributions of the assessed variables. Tests of goodness of fit including the 
adjusted coefficient of determination (𝑅 ̅ 2), t-tests, standard error of estimate 
(Se) and ANOVA were also done. The regression was performed in the form 
of a panel; several panel regression options, fixed effects, random effects, 
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OLS, generalized squares (GLS), and panel that is dynamic were performed. 
Because OLS makes no use of the information contained in the unequal 
variability exhibited by the predictor and to ensure that the analysis produces 
the best linear estimators GLS has also been used. The General Estimation 
Equation (GEE) procedure has been used to extend the generalized linear 
model (GLM) to allow for repeat measurements. This allowed analysis of the 
variables of the study over the ten-year period in the research. 
 
Results 
 The procedure for Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) was 
applied in extending the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) to enable the 
researcher to analyze repeated data measurements. The GLM repeated data 
measures technique affords examination of variance in cases where similar 
measurements are done several times on each subject or case.  For instance, 
ROA was measured for 10 years in this study. By adopting the general linear 
model technique, the study tested the hypotheses regarding influence of both 
the between-subjects elements and the within-subjects elements. These 
explored relationships among elements in addition to influence of individual 
elements. Furthermore, the influence of constant covariates and covariate 
interactions with the between-subjects elements were included. The GLM 
repeated measures technique enabled the researcher to determine the values 
of multiple dependent scale variables obtained at multiple time periods, based 
on their association to categorical and scale independent variables and the 
time periods at which they were obtained. This section presents the result of 
how ROA depend on gender diversity of boards and board composition using 
the GEE procedure. The model information table 1 below summarizes the 
section on modelling selection to ensure that the procedure fits the 
appropriate model. 
Table 1: Model Information 
Dependent Variable Return on Assets 
Probability Distribution Normal 
Link Function Identity 
Subject Effect 1 Name 
Within-Subject Effect 1 Year 
Working Correlation Matrix Structure Unstructured 
Author, 2017 
 
 The Normal Probability Distribution (NPD) is appropriate since return 
on total asset is a scale variable and its values take a symmetric, bell-shaped 
distribution about a central (mean) value. The link function is an alteration of 
the dependent variable that permits prediction of the model. The following 
link function which can also be used with any distribution is used – Identity, 
f(x) = x. The dependent variable is not altered.  
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 The name captures the names of the firms in this study, which are the 
main subjects of the study. The year captures the within subject data. The 
working correlation matrix is a representative of the within-subject 
dependencies. The size is indicated by the number of observations and thus 
the amalgamation of values of within-subject variables. There are five 
possible structures: Independent which assumes that repeated observations 
are uncorrelated; AR (1) in which it is assumed that repeated observations 
have a first-order autoregressive association and that the correlation among 
any two elements is equal to r for adjacent elements, r2 for elements that are 
separated by a third, and so on. r is constrained so that –1<r<1; Exchangeable 
which assumed that the structure has homogenous correlations between 
elements, it is also known as a compound symmetry structure; M-dependent 
in which it is assumed that consecutive observations have a common 
correlation coefficient, pairs of observations separated by a third have a 
common correlation coefficient, and so on, through pairs of observations 
separated by m−1 other observations. Observations with greater separation 
are assumed to be uncorrelated; unstructured, which is a completely general 
correlation matrix (help ibm.spss.statistics, 2017). The Working Correlation 
Matrix Structure with the best result, based on the data in this study is 
unstructured. The other structure does not tell much. The results are presented 
in sections 4.1 and 4.2, in summary the results indicate that gender diversity 
of boards and board composition operationalized through the number of 
female board members and proportion on non-executive directors does not 
significantly affects firm performance. 
 
Gender Diversity of Boards and Firm Performance 
The GEE results for firm performance and board diversity 
operationalized through ROA and the categories of number of female 
directors on the board respectively are presented in tables 2. 
Table 2a: Categorical Variable Information 
 N Percent 
Factor 
Categories Of Number of 
female directors on the 
board 
No Female Director in The Board 100 12.7% 
1 to 2 Female Directors In The Board 412 52.2% 
3 and More Female directors in The 
Board 
278 35.2% 
Total 790 100.0% 
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Table 2b: Goodness of Fita 
 
 Value 
Quasi Likelihood under Independence Model Criterion (QIC)b 17882.429 
Corrected Quasi Likelihood under Independence Model 
Criterion (QICC)b 
17624.540 
 
Table 2c: Tests of Model Effects 
Source Type III 
Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
(Interce
pt) 
1.392 1 .238 
NFmDB
Cla 
3.488 2 .175 
 
Table 2d: Parameter Estimates 
 B Std. 
Error 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
(Intercept) 3.703 .7689 2.196 5.209 23.190 1 .000 
[NFmDBCl
a=0] 
-6.645 4.2404 -14.956 1.667 2.455 1 .117 
[NFmDBCl
a=1] 
.702 .8074 -.880 2.284 .756 1 .385 
[NFmDBCl
a=2] 
0a . . . . . . 
(Scale) 22.387       
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
 
Table 2 e: Estimated Marginal Means  
Categories Of Number of female 
directors on the board 
Mean Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Upper 
No Female Director in The 
Board 
-2.942 4.170 -11.115 5.231 
1 to 2 Female Directors In The 
Board 
4.404 .788 2.859 5.949 
3 and More Female directors in 
The Board 
3.702 .768 2.195 5.209 
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Table 2 f: Working Correlation Matrixa 
Measureme
nt 
Measurement 
[Yea
r = 
200
6] 
[Yea
r = 
2007
] 
[Yea
r = 
2008
] 
[Yea
r = 
2009
] 
[Yea
r = 
201
0] 
[Yea
r = 
2011
] 
[Yea
r = 
2012
] 
[Yea
r = 
2013
] 
[Yea
r = 
2014
] 
[Yea
r 
201
5] 
[Year = 
2006] 
1.00 .915 .915 .698 .616 .427 .501 .472 .440 .372 
[Year = 
2007] 
.915 1.00 .915 .791 .740 .575 .632 .638 .577 .469 
[Year = 
2008] 
.915 .915 1.00 .863 .724 .613 .650 .700 .559 .504 
[Year = 
2009] 
.698 .791 .863 1.00 .635 .487 .603 .659 .511 .450 
[Year = 
2010] 
.616 .740 .724 .635 1.00 .586 .697 .681 .524 .464 
[Year = 
2011] 
.427 .575 .613 .487 .586 1.00 .678 .616 .489 .425 
[Year = 
2012] 
.501 .632 .650 .603 .697 .678 1.00 .779 .606 .562 
[Year = 
2013] 
.472 .638 .700 .659 .681 .616 .779 1.00 .696 .722 
[Year = 
2014] 
.440 .577 .559 .511 .524 .489 .606 .696 1.00 .530 
[Year = 
2015] 
.372 .469 .504 .450 .464 .425 .562 .722 .530 1.00 
a. Ridge value was added to the working correlation matrix to make it positive definite. 
 
Table 2 g: General Estimable Function 
Parameter Contrast 
L1 L2 L3 
(Intercept) 1 0 0 
[NFmDBCl
a=0] 
0 1 0 
[NFmDBCl
a=1] 
0 0 1 
[NFmDBCl
a=2] 
1 -1 -1 
                                                                                                                                   
 Table 2a provides the results for the three categories of board 
diversity that were identified being no female director on the board (12.7% 
of the firms), 1 to 2 female directors (52.2%of the firms) and the third 
category 3 or more female directors (35.2% of the firms). Table 2b shows 
that the unstructured correlation structure provides a better model and is used 
in this section. Table 5.10d provides the reference category for presence of 3 
or more female directors is NFmDBCla=2, that is, firms with 3 or more 
female directors; and the value of 0.702 for NFmDBCla=1 means that, all 
European Scientific Journal December 2017 edition Vol.13, No.34 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
73 
other things being equal, we would expect the ROA of firms with 1 to 2 
directors to be 0.702 higher than firms with 3 or more female directors with a 
significance of 0.385; and ROA for no female director on the board to be -
6.645 lower than that of 1 to 2 female directors with a significance of 0.117 
indicating that this association is not statistically significant. Overall the 
findings show that female directors impact firm performance, table 2e 
reveals that the mean ROA is -2.94% for firms with no female director on 
the board, 4.4% for firms with 1 to 2 female directors on the board and 3.7% 
for firms with 3 or more female directors, however this relationship is not 
statistically significant. This means that diversity of the board is not a 
potential predictor of firm performance as measured by ROA. Table 2f 
indicate that there is no information in the history as years 2006 and 2015 
have very low correlation, the correlation decreases as the gap in the years 
increase. 
 
Board Composition and Firm Performance 
 The GEE results for firm performance and board composition 
operationalized through ROA and the categories of number of independent 
directors are presented in table 3. 
Table 3a: Categorical Variable Information 
 N Percent 
Factor 
Categories of Number 
of independent 
directors on the board 
Absence of Independent Director 320 40.5% 
Presence of Independent Director 470 59.5% 
Total 790 100.0% 
Table 3b: Goodness of Fita 
 Value 
Quasi Likelihood under Independence Model Criterion (QIC)b 12418.036 
Corrected Quasi Likelihood under Independence Model Criterion (QICC)b 12388.501 
Dependent Variable: Return on Total Assets              a. Information criteria are in small-is-better 
form 
Model: (Intercept), NIDOBCla                                     b. Computed using the full log quasi-
likelihood function 
 
Table 3c: Tests of Model Effects & Parameter Estimates 
Source 
Type III 
Wald Chi-Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) 80.395 1 0 
NIDOBCla 2.192 1 0.139 
  
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Hypothesis Test 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Si
g. 
(Intercept) 4.065 .6087 2.871 5.258 44.587 1 
.00
0 
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[NIDOBCla=0] -1.152 .7781 -2.677 .373 2.192 1 
.13
9 
[NIDOBCla=1] 0a . . . . . . 
(Scale) 15.716       
 
Table 3d: Estimated Marginal Means 
Categories of Number of 
independent directors on the 
board 
Mean Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval 
  Lower Upper 
Absence of Independent 
Directors 
2.912502 
.48474
44 
1.962420 3.862583 
Presence of Independent 
Directors 
4.064545 
.60870
86 
2.871498 5.257592 
 
Table 3e: Working Correlation Matrixa 
Measurement 
Measurement[Year] 
2006
] 2007] 
2008
] 2009] 
201
0] 
2011
] 
2012
] 2013] 
201
4] 
201
5] 
[Year = 2006 
] 
1.00 .948 .948 .679 .57
6 
.267 .349 .320 .310 .26
2 
[Year = 2007] .948 1.00 .948 .733 .67
6 
.402 .458 .479 .429 .31
9 
[Year = 2008] .948 .948 1.00 .766 .58
0 
.385 .414 .498 .331 .29
8 
[Year = 2009] .679 .733 .766 1.00 .54
6 
.297 .439 .534 .355 .31
3 
[Year = 2010] .576 .676 .580 .546 1.0
0 
.458 .593 .582 .391 .35
1 
[Year = 2011] .267 .402 .385 .297 .45
8 
1.00 .532 .453 .306 .26
1 
[Year = 2012] .349 .458 .414 .439 .59
3 
.532 1.00 .665 .451 .43
4 
[Year = 2013] .320 .479 .498 .534 .58
2 
.453 .665 1.00 .594 .67
9 
[Year = 2014] .310 .429 .331 .355 .39
1 
.306 .451 .594 1.00 .43
8 
[Year = 2015] .262 .319 .298 .313 .35
1 
.261 .434 .679 .438 1.0
0 
Dependent Variable: Return on Total Assets 
Model: (Intercept), NIDOBCla 
a. Ridge value was added to the working correlation matrix to make it positive definite. 
 
Table 3f: General Estimable Function 
Parameter 
Contrast 
L1 L2 
(Intercept) 1 0 
[NIDOBCla=0] 0 1 
[NIDOBCla=1] 1 -1 
Dependent Variable: Return on Total Assets Model: (Intercept), NIDOBCla 
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 Table 3a provides the results for the two categories of board 
composition being presence of independent directors and absence where 
40.5% of the firms had no independent director while 59.5% had 
independent directors. Table 3b shows that the unstructured correlation 
structure provides a better model and is used in this section. Table 3c 
provides the reference category for presence of independent directors is 
NIDOBCla=1, that is, firms with independent directors; and the value of -
1.152 for NIDOBCla=0 means that, all other things being equal, the ROA of 
firms without independent directors should be -1.152 lower than firms with 
independent directors with a significance of 0.139, showing that this 
relationship is not statistically significant. In overall terms, these results 
indicate that the presence of independent directors improves performance.  
Table 3d shows that the mean ROA is 4.06% for firms with independent 
directors and 2.91% for firms without independent directors.  However, this 
relationship is not statistically significant. This means that board composition 
is not a potential predictor of performance as measured by ROA. Table 3e 
indicates that there is no information in the history as years 2006 and 2015 
have very low correlation, the correlation decreases as the gap in the years 
increase. 
 
Conclusion & Recommendations 
 The results presented mixed findings on the association among 
gender diversity of boards, board compositions and performance of financial 
institutions in Kenya. While several studies document a positive influence of 
board structure variables on performance, others found the opposite. The 
findings in this study conclude that both gender diversity of boards and 
board composition do not affect performance of financial institutions in 
Kenya. The mixed findings could be linked to the variety of methodologies 
and definitions of variables used and the study contextual factors that were 
not included in the analysis by the models used.   
 Prior studies have postulated that corporate governance is critical 
to organizational success. Board structures have also been linked to 
performance. However, limited empirical literature existed on the 
influence of gender diversity of boards and board composition on firm 
performance in emerging economies. This study sought to establish this 
relationship. The study results will arouse deeper academic discourse of 
the relationship of these concepts; form a basis for strengthening policy 
as well as managerial practice in financial institutions in Kenya and 
beyond. 
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